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FARAGHER, ELLERTH, AND THE FEDERAL LAW OF
VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT BY
SUPERVISORS: SOMETHING LOST, SOMETHING GAINED,
AND SOMETHING TO GUARD AGAINST
William R. Corbett*
In this Essay, the author faces his nightmare exam question: he must define
"sexual harassment" to the satisfaction of several potential graders with different
perspectives on sexual harassment law. His valiant effort tojustify his response
leads him to a discussion of the federal law of vicarious liability for sexual
harassment by supervisors after the Supreme Court's recent rejection of tort law
respondeat superior analysis for such claims under Title VII.
The author argues that, while the rejection of the tort standard for vicarious
liability in Title VII claims removes the longstanding connection between Title VII
law and state tort law, the result is appropriate given their different objectives. He
further warns that, now that the ties between state tort law and Title VII have been
severed, courts should not allow developments in sexual harassment cases to unduly
influence state respondeat superior law.
I. INTRODUCTION: A NIGHTMARE EXAM ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT
The final exam in your law school Employment Discrimination course consists
of one multiple choice question. You may select only one answer. If you wish, you
may write an essay in support of the answer you select, but you are not required to
do so. Your exam will be graded by one of the following persons, selected at
random: Professor Catharine MacKinnon,' Justice Clarence Thomas,2 Professor
Anita Bernstein,3 or Judge Susan Webber Wright.4 The exam question is:
" Vice Chancellor and Rosemary Neal Hawkland Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana
State University Law Center. I thank my colleague Kenneth M. Murchison for helpful
discussions and advice. I thank Jennifer Aaron Hataway and Kelly McCarthy Rabalais,
Louisiana State University Law School Class of 1999, for research assistance.
Professor MacKinnon argued that sexual harassment should constitute sex
discrimination under federal law before courts generally accepted this view. See CATHARINE
A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION (1979). She further argued that sexual harassment reinforces and expresses
women's traditional and inferior role in the labor force. See id. at 4.
2 Justice Thomas has argued that sexual harassment is not a free-standing tort, but rather
is a form of employment discrimination and, so, should not be treated differently than other
forms of sex discrimination. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2275
(1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
3 Professor Bernstein advocates an adjudicative approach to sexual harassment law and
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"Sexual harassment" is
A) the subordination of women by men in the workplace;
B) a type of employment discrimination based on sex, which is prohibited
by public law, a federal statute;
C) a type of employment discrimination based on sex, which is prohibited
by a federal statute, but which is like private law, having many tort
characteristics; or
D) what a governor did to a state employee in 1991.
Law professors face this situation every year when they are writing and grading
final exams. They have nightmares. Sometimes they dream they are law students
taking exams and they encounter the worst exam imaginable. Well, the above exam
is my nightmare. As an employment discrimination teacher, I am interested in the
law of sexual harassment, and I occasionally think I have something mildly
interesting to say about issues in this area of the law. It is daunting to write in this
area, however, because the literature is vast and many writers on the subject fashion
comprehensive theories of sexual harassment, including explanations for its
occurrence and prevalence and prescriptions for how the legal system should address
it. So, my exam nightmare requires a definition of sexual harassment. But because
the spirits will not quit visiting my slumber' until I answer the question they pose,
I guess I must answer. I am tempted to live dangerously-mark an answer and hope
I get the appropriate grader. But, I am a law professor and, accordingly, I am
convinced that I can persuade anyone of anything through my cogent analysis. I will
write. For good measure, I will put in a few footnotes; law professors cannot write
without them. But which answer? My Essay has to say something topical-cutting
edge. That means I should address the decisions of the Supreme Court on sexual
harassment from the last term: Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,6 Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton,7 and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services.' Well, maybe not
has proposed a "respectful person" standard to protect respect for individuals. See Anita
Bernstein, An Old Jurisprudence: Respect in Retrospect, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1231 (1998)
[hereinafter Respect in Retrospect]; Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with
Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 446 (1997).
4 Judge Wright presided over Paula Jones's sexual harassment suit against President
Clinton. See Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark.), appeal dismissed, 161 F.3d 528
(8th Cir. 1998). Judge Wright dismissed the quid pro quo claim because Jones failed to
demonstrate "tangible job detriment," id at 669, and dismissed the hostile environment claim
because the alleged contacts did not constitute the kind of severe or pervasive conduct that
courts require, see id. at 674.
' See CHARLES DICKENS, A CHRISTMAS CAROL (Airmont 1963) (1843).
6 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
7 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
1 18 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
[Vol. 7:3
VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Oncale. If I write about the two related cases, Ellerth and Faragher, which deal with
the issue of the basis for imposing liability on employers for supervisors' sexual
harassment, then I can claim that the scope of my analysis is limited and that many
issues are beyond it. If I say much about Oncale, I myself probably will have to
propose an all-encompassing theory of sexual harassment. That is too risky. As I
have suggested, I am not sure that I have such a theory, and, even if I could develop
one, my grader might disagree with it.
Here goes: I pick answer C. Now, I think my grade from Professor Bernstein
is safe, but just in case my grader is one of the others, I had better offer a good
explanation.
II. STATE TORT LAW AND STATE RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR ANALYSIS 9
On December 27, 1987, a female clinical technician at Humana Hospital-
Brentwood in Shreveport, Louisiana, went into the second-floor nurses' lounge, sat
down, and began her break." Not long after she sat down, a male nursing supervisor
walked into the lounge, turned off the lights, and jumped on the clinical technician,
mauling her. The clinical technician eventually pushed the nursing supervisor off of
her and returned to work." She later sued her employer, alleging that the nursing
supervisor committed a sexual battery and that the hospital was vicariously liable for
his tort.' Should the employer be held liable? Courts in Louisiana, as in many other
states, usually determine an employer's liability for the torts of its employee by
9 I placed the title for my Essay at the beginning, instead of here. I know that does not
seem reasonable, but, just in case my Essay is published, and-make one more leap with
me-just in case somebody wants to cite it, I need a law review-like title at the beginning.
Although this may seem like a bizarre Essay, the reader will note that the title is quite
conventional, including the obligatory colon. I wish I had been able to work in the
quintessential law review word "paradigm." Paradigm is one of the most favored words for
law review article titles; a search of the Westlaw JLR database reveals 251 entries for articles
with "paradigm" in the title. Another law review word that I would like to have used is
"connexity." Although it does not appear in law review titles, this word, which is not
included in any dictionary I have used, made 53 appearances in articles in the JLR database.
Try as I might, however, I could not work "paradigm" and "connexity" in without choosing
a title that suggests I am setting forth a complete theory of sexual harassment. For good
measure, I also wish I could have used "new millennium." Consider, for example, the
grandiose expectations that the following title would have generated: "Faragher, Ellerth, and
the Federal Law of Vicarious Liability for Sexual Harassment by Supervisors: A New
Paradigm for a New Millennium Based on Disconnexity Between Federal Sexual Harassment
Law and State Tort Law." See what I mean? I do not think this short Essay could fulfill
whatever expectations would have been generated by such a powerful title.
'0 See Baumeister v. Plunkett, 673 So. 2d 994, 994-95 (La. 1996).
11 See id. at 995.
12 See id. at 996.
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analyzing whether the employee's wrongdoing was in the course and scope of
employment. 3 In Baumeister v. Plunkett, the Supreme Court of Louisiana undertook
a meticulous analysis of the state's vicarious liability, 4 or respondeat superior, 5 law.
One gets the impression from reading the opinion that the court was writing about
vicarious liability of employers for state law tort claims, while often pausing to think
about sexual harassment claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.16
Such a claim was not at issue in the case, but the spectre of such claims haunts the
opinion. 7
The Louisiana court divided the course-of-employment inquiry into two
subfactors: time (hours of employment) and place (employer's premises).' The court
also divided the scope inquiry, the more complex of the two, into two subfactors:
whether the tortious act "was primarily employment rooted" and whether the act "was
reasonably incidental to the performance of the employee's duties."' 9 There was
nothing new about these factors and subfactors, as the court had articulated them in
an earlier Louisiana case addressing the vicarious liability of an employer for the
'3 See id. (citing Orgeron v. McDonald, 639 So. 2d 224, 226 (La. 1994)).
"' "'Vicarious liability' may be defined as the imposition of liability upon one party for
a wrong committed by another party. One of its most common forms is the imposition of
liability on an employer for the wrong of an employee or agent." Alan 0. Sykes, The
Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule
and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 563 (1988) (citation omitted).
5 "Respondeat superior" comes from the Latin phrase "let the superior respond." EUGENE
EHRLICH, A DICTIONARY OF LATIN TAGS AND PHRASES 198 (1987). For discussion of the
origins and rationales of respondeat superior, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 454-55 (6th ed. 1995); Rochelle Rubin Weber, Note, "Scope of
Employment" Redefined: Holding Employers Vicariously Liable for Sexual Assaults
Committed by Their Employees, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1513 (1992).
16 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
'" It is not clear to what extent the Supreme Court of Louisiana or any other state court
needed to be concerned about the impact of decisions regarding state law respondeat superior
analysis on Title VII sexual harassment claims. As will be discussed infra, some courts
applied a scope-of-employment analysis that seemed to be a freestanding Title VII version
of vicarious liability, not derived from state cases. Other courts used other bases of liability
for sexual harassment by supervisors, such as negligence based on notice. See infra notes 34,
92-94 and accompanying text. Still, some courts applied the state law analysis to the federal
statutory claims. See, e.g., Alphonse v. Omni Hotels Management Corp., 643 So. 2d 836, 840
(La. App. 4th 1994) ("Under Title VII, liability attaches to the employer only if it is shown
that the conduct occurred within the course and scope of the harasser's employment, and the
employer failed to prevent or correct the situation."). Moreover, the state respondeat superior
analysis influenced even the seemingly independent Title VII scope-of-employment analysis.
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intentional tort of its employee.2" It was the application of the factors to conduct that
would also constitute sexual harassment under federal employment discrimination
law, however, that was interesting.
The court addressed the course of employment first and found that both
subfactors were satisfied: the assault occurred during working hours and on the
employer's premises." The court then moved to the more difficult scope analysis.
Essentially, that. analysis requires asking whether the risk of harm that befell a
plaintiff is a risk that is associated with the employment; if so, then it is a risk for
which the employer should bear the cost.22 The court concluded that neither of the
scope subfactors was satisfied." Regarding whether the act was reasonably
incidental to employment duties, the court held that "[a] nursing supervisor's
responsibilities do not include sexually oriented physical conduct with a co-
employee," and such conduct was not foreseeable at the hospital during working
hours. 4 Turning to whether the act was rooted primarily in employment, the court
defined that subfactor as an inquiry into whether serving the employer's business
motivated the employee to "'any appreciable extent."'2 5 The court held that the
employer's business did not actuate the nursing supervisor to any extent.26 It was
then that the court cast a cautious glance at sexual harassment law and added: "We
do not mean to state, however, that all sexual acts are of a personal nature and might
not sometimes be employment rooted. '27 Thus, the court left open a window for
holding employers vicariously liable for supervisors' sexual assaults and batteries.
In summary, the court concluded that, while there is "no magical formula" regarding
course and scope that is necessary to impose vicarious liability, course alone will not
be enough for an intentional tort: "There must additionally be at least some evidence
that the intentional act was reasonably incidental to the performance of the
employee's duties or that the tortious act was primarily employment rooted. 28
20 See LeBrane, 292 So. 2d at 218.
21 See Baumeister, 673 So. 2d at 999.
22 See Ermert v. Hartford Ins. Co., 559 So. 2d 467, 476-77 (La. 1990).
23 See Baumeister, 673 So. 2d at 999.
24 Id.
25 Id. (quoting Ermert, 559 So. 2d at 476-77).
26 See id.
27 Id. at 1000. The Supreme Court of Louisiana earlier had recognized the relationship
between sexual harassment and intentional tort theories of recovery in one of its two
decisions involving the tort theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See
Bustamento v. Tucker, 607 So. 2d 532, 541 n.13 (La. 1992) ("While because of the
procedural posture of this case we do not reach the merits of [plaintiff's] tort claim, we note
that courts in other jurisdictions have recognized that a pattern of harassment that creates a
hostile work environment can constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress.").
28 Baumeister, 673 So. 2d at 1000. The conclusion that a strong case on course is not by
itself sufficient to impose vicarious liability is in contrast to the conclusion in some Louisiana
cases evaluating the workers' compensation issue of whether a "personal injury by accident
1999]
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There is nothing particularly remarkable about the Louisiana court's vicarious
liability analysis for a state tort in Baumeister. Courts throughout the nation have
reached divergent results in cases involving similar facts.29 Although one reasonably
can argue that the Louisiana court should have held otherwise, the respondeat
superior analysis is certainly within the mainstream in the nation.30 What is
interesting about the Baumeister opinion, however, is its careful reservation of the
possibility of the imposition of vicarious liability for conduct constituting sexual
harassment.3' What would have been the result if the clinical technician had sued her
aris[es] out of and in the course of... employment." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 23:103 1(A) (West
1998). Although the language of the workers' compensation statute is different from the
vicarious liability test, Louisiana courts have treated the two as interchangeable and have
cited cases involving workers' compensation and cases involving respondeat superior
interchangeably. See, e.g., Benoit v. Capitol Mfg. Co., 617 So. 2d 477 (La. 1993) ("[T]he
employment connection tort test is similar to that used in determining whether a
compensation claim is one arising out of and in the course of employment." (citing LeBrane
v. Lewis, 292 So. 2d 216, 218 n.4 (La. 1974))). Louisiana courts balancing the "arising out
of' and "in the course of' employment factors in workers' compensation cases have stated
that "when the employee is squarely within the course of his employment, virtually any
risk ... has been considered as arising out of employment." Mundy v. Department of Health
& Human Resources, 593 So. 2d 346, 349 (La. 1992). In contrast, the court in Baumeister
held that a finding that the attacking employee was squarely in the course of employment was
not enough to impose vicarious liability. See Baumeister, 673 So. 2d at 1000.
I do not find objectionable this divergence between the respondeat superior test for tort
liability and the test for workers' compensation coverage. I have long criticized the courts'
treatment of the tests as interchangeable. The different policies undergirding tort law and
workers' compensation support a more restrictive course and scope analysis for respondeat
superior (imposing liability in relatively fewer cases) and a more expansive course and arises-
out-of analysis for workers' compensation (imposing liability in relatively more cases). I
elaborate on this point here because similar reasoning regarding state tort law and Title VII
is the basis for my conclusion that the Supreme Court reached a good result in Faragher and
Ellerth by developing a more expansive theory of liability for supervisors' sexual harassment
than that offered by respondeat superior. See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
29 See, e.g., Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 953, 978 (D.
Minn. 1998) ("The Minnesota Courts have frequently addressed the relation of an
employee's sexual assault to the scope of his employment, and have reached divergent
results.... A brief survey of other jurisdictions demonstrates that there is no consensus on
the application of respondeat superior to a sexual assault by an employee." (citations
omitted)); see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2286 (1998) (citing
federal cases holding each way). See generally Weber, supra note 15 (surveying the
divergent results reached by various courts and recommending a reformulation of the scope
analysis).
30 See Weber, supra note 15, at 1513 n.2 (discussing cases holding employers liable for
sexual assaults committed by employees and cases not holding employers liable).
" See Baumeister, 673 So. 2d at 1000 ("We do not mean to state, however, that all sexual
acts are of a personal nature and might not sometimes be employment rooted.").
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employer for sexual harassment under Title VII? Would a federal or state court have
concluded that, although the conduct might constitute actionable sexual harassment,
the employer would not be liable because the supervisor was not in the scope of his
employment? Should a court reach that conclusion? Is a different result under Title
VII and state tort law appropriate when the underlying conduct is the same?
For me, as a torts and employment discrimination teacher, Baumeister was a
harbinger of the Supreme Court's rejection, two years later, of scope-of-employment
analysis as a basis for employers' liability for supervisors' sexual harassment and the
Court's fashioning of a distinct federal common law of vicarious liability. 2
I should state two clarifications before proceeding. First, respondeat superior
scope-of-employment analysis is not the only basis on which an employer can be held
liable for the torts of its employees. The Restatement (Second) ofAgency provides
other bases for the imposition of liability when an employee was acting outside the
scope of employment: the employer intended the conduct or consequences; the
employer was negligent or reckless; the conduct violated a nondelegable duty of the
employer; the employee acted with apparent authority; or the employee was aided in
accomplishing-the tort by the agency relationship.33 The respondeat superior course-
and-scope analysis, however, has been the most pervasive basis for imposing liability
on employers for the torts of their employees. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
rejected this analysis-or the Title VII version of it-in Faragher and Ellerth as a
basis for holding employers liable for sexual harassment by supervisors.
The second clarification is that I am not suggesting that all courts evaluating
supervisor sexual harassment cases under Title VII have analyzed them under the
scope-of-employment analysis, or that those that did so relied upon state court
opinions applying the analysis to torts. Courts, instead, used several different bases
to impose liability on employers.34 Moreover, even when courts did use scope
analysis for Title VII sexual harassment cases, they usually cited not to state court
opinions involving torts, but to federal court opinions involving Title VII." That
32 See infra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
See I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
14 See BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
EMPLOYMENT LAw 62-67 (1992 & Supp. 1997) (classifying the approaches as scope-of-
employment, apparent authority, and direct liability (breach of duty to prevent and remedy
harassment)); see also Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 1994)
(analyzing all three theories). For a comparison of common law vicarious liability and agency
law with the statutory approach to vicarious liability under federal employment
discrimination statutes, see Rebecca Hanner White, Vicarious and Personal Liability for
Employment Discrimination, 30 GA. L. REV. 509, 526-45 (1996).
" See, e.g., Jansen v. Packaging Corp. Of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 523 & n.9 (7th Cir. 1997)
(Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that all Title VII cases decided
by federal courts treat the basis for employer liability as an issue governed by federal
common law), affd sub nom. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998);
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being said, the respondeat superior analysis for state tort claims preceded the Title
VII vicarious liability analysis, and it exerted an influence-indeed, so much so that
the Supreme Court found it necessary to discuss it and reject it in Faragher and
Ellerth.36 It is worth noting that the fact that state courts can and do hear Title VII
cases 37'and that federal courts can and do hear state tort cases38 facilitates the cross-
fertilization between state tort cases and Title VII cases that I am describing. Thus,
I proceed to examine the Supreme Court's severance of the respondeat superior link
between state tort law and Title VII sexual harassment law.
III. FEDERAL SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW AND FEDERAL VICARIOUS LIABILITY
ANALYSIS
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court declared, in Meritor Savings Bank,
FSB v. Vinson,39 that hostile environment is a type of sexual harassment actionable
under Title VII.40 The Meritor case also sowed the seeds of the difficult questions
with which courts have struggled since the decision: (1) Under what circumstances
is conduct severe and pervasive enough to be actionable as hostile environment
sexual harassment?; and (2) On what basis is an employer to be held liable for
conduct by an employee that constitutes sexual harassment? For almost a decade
Andrade v. Mayfair Management, Inc., 88 F.3d 258, 261 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing federal cases
for the proposition that an employer is liable for a sexually hostile work environment created
by a supervisor or other employee only if the employer knew or should have known of the
illegal conduct and failed to take prompt and adequate remedial action).
36 See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2287; Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2265-66. Some would say that
the Court rejected only the distinct Title VII version of scope-of-employment analysis, but
the Court discussed the Title VII version and compared it with the tort version applied by
state courts. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2287. The Court recognized that the best approach
to reconciling Title VII cases holding sexual harassment to be outside the scope of
employment and state tort cases applying a broad scope analysis to include sexual assaults
is "to recognize that their disparate results do not necessarily reflect wildly varying terms of
the particular employment contracts involved, but represent differing judgments about the
desirability of holding an employer liable for his subordinates' wayward behavior." Id. The
Court also quoted the preeminent torts commentators on the meaning of "scope of
employment." See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2266 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 70, at 505 (5th ed. 1984)).
"7 Federal district courts and state courts have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over
Title VII claims. See Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 820 (1990).
38 Federal courts often have subject matter jurisdiction over state tort claims under either
diversity of citizenship, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994), or supplemental jurisdiction, see id.
§ 1367.
39 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
40 See id at 66-67.
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after Meritor, the Supreme Court let the law develop in the lower courts. Not until
1995 did the Court revisit the first question in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.4
Regarding the second question, Meritor probably made a later visit inevitable.
The Court in Meritor declined to state a rule regarding the basis for employer liability
but, instead, instructed the lower courts to look to agency principles.42 The Court
cautioned that "such common-law principles may not be transferable in all their
particulars to Title VII," but the Court inferred from Congress's use of the word
"agent" in the definition of "employer" that Congress intended to place some limits
on employers' liability for sexual harassment. The federal courts did not develop
a consensus on a basis for employer liability. The context in which courts" and
commentators 5 divided most sharply was the basis for employer liability for hostile
environment harassment by supervisors.
The diversity of approaches reached its zenith--or nadir depending on your
perspective-in the Seventh Circuit's eight separate opinions (in addition to the per
curiam opinion) in Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of America.46 With the full court
granting rehearing in two consolidated cases, Jansen was anticipated eagerly as a
case that would solidify the "quagmire." '4 Instead, the case produced a plaintive cry
for help from the venerable Seventh Circuit.48
41 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
42 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
13 See id.
4 See supra note 34.
41 Compare Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability
of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REV.
66 (1995), with J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment Discrimination Law, 81
VA. L. REv. 273 (1995). Professor Oppenheimer argues that courts have misapplied agency
law to hostile environment situations. See Oppenheimer, supra, at 141-43. He contends that
a supervisor usually is within the scope of his employment-time, place, business purpose,
incidental to duties of the job-when he commits sexually harassing conduct. See id.
Applying agency standards, Professor Oppenheimer argues for strict liability in hostile
environment claims when based upon the conduct of supervisors. See id at 153. Professor
Verkerke, in contrast, argues that courts should impose liability on an employer for both quid
pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment (other than systemic harassment) only
when the employer has been put on notice and had an opportunity to act. See Verkerke,
supra, at 279.
46 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
" Oppenheimer, supra note 45, at 76. Professor Oppenheimer so described the focus on
basis for liability, a collateral matter, when courts should be focusing on the central issues
of sexual harassment law: whether harassment occurred and what the remedy should be if it
occurred. See id.
48 The per curiam opinion on two noncontroversial issues closed with the following:
The court's inability to forge a majority position with regard to the proper
standard for evaluating an employer's liability for sexual harassment by a
1999]
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The Supreme Court answered the distress call. In 1998, the Court, in Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth49 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,5° announced a
standard for imposing liability on employers for supervisors' sexual harassment. In
those cases the Court took an agency theory from the Restatement (Second) of
Agency5 and fashioned a uniform vicarious liability standard, which is "not federal
common law in 'the strictest sense."' 52 The Court instead called it "[a] federal rule,
based on a body of case law developed over time, [that] is statutory interpretation
pursuant to congressional direction."53 In fashioning this law from the approaches
available in section 219 of the Restatement,54 the Court rejected scope-of-
employment as the only basis for imposing employer liability for supervisors' sexual
harassment of employees." The Court based the new law instead on the "aided-by-
supervisory employee means that panels of the court that have similar cases in
the future, and the district judges of this circuit on remand in these cases and in
similar future cases, will have to determine and be guided by the narrowest
grounds for the decisions in these two cases. Perhaps in some future case this
court will be able to forge a majority position; perhaps the Supreme Court will
bring order to the chaotic case law in this important field of practice.
Jansen, 123 F.3d at 494-95 (per curiam) (citation omitted). Several of the opinions in Jansen
debated whether the basis for liability for hostile environment created by supervisors should
be decided as a matter of federal common law or state law. See infra note 90 and
accompanying text.
49 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
50 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
"' See 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
52 Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2265 (quoting Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997)).
" Id. Whatever it is, its development is what Judge Easterbrook objected to in his opinion
in Jansen. See Jansen, 123 F.3d at 552-56 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting in part). Judge
Easterbrook, looking to state agency principles, stated: "Meritor tells us to 'look to,' not
'make up,' agency principles. One can 'look to' principles only in an existing body of
law, . . . for there is no free-floating common law." Id. at 553 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting in
part) (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
14 The Court felt bound by Meritor to stick with this source. See, e.g., Faragher, 118 S.
Ct. at 2291 n.4 (stating that the Court was bound to honor Meritor on this point because of
the high value of stare decisis in statutory interpretation and because of Congress' reliance
on Meritor in revising Title VII); Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270 ("Congress has not altered
Meritor's rule even through it has made significant amendments to Title VII in the interim.").
For an argument that the Court gave Meritor more weight than it was due and misapplied the
principle of enhanced stare decisis in statutory interpretation, see The Supreme Court, 1997
Term-Leading Cases, 112 HARV. L. REv. 313, 313-14 (1998) ("The Court's approach
should have been limited by a rule that.., enhanced stare decisis in statutory interpretation
should apply only when relevant precedent has sent a clear signal to the legislature.").
5' See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2290; Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2267. In Ellerth, the Court
concluded that part of its opinion with what may prove to be unfortunate dictum: "The
general rule is that sexual harassment by a supervisor is not conduct within the scope of
employment." Id. at 2267. Courts employing respondeat superior analysis for tort claims
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agency-relation" basis of section 219(2)(d). 6 Under this new federal law of vicarious
liability, an employer is liable for the hostile environment created by a supervisor
with immediate or higher authority over the plaintiff employee." If the employer
took a "tangible employment action" against the plaintiff employee, there is no
escape from liability." If the employer has taken no such employment action, then
the employer may avoid liability if it can establish an affirmative defense, consisting
of two components: the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly
correct the sexual harassment; and the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage
of the opportunities provided by the employer or otherwise failed to avoid harm 9
IV. FEDERAL SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW AND STATE TORT LAW
After the Court decided Faragher and Ellerth, I received a call from an attorney
who told me that those cases had overruled Baumeister v. Plunkett.'" I asked him to
explain what he meant. He told me that his client was suing her employer for an
employee's sexual battery and that the law that would determine whether the
employer could be held liable was that announced in the recent Supreme Court
decisions rather than Baumeister. The first problem with the attorney's argument
was that it is not clear that the employee who committed the battery was a supervisor.
Faragher and Ellerth did not change the standard applied to determine employer
liability for sexual harassment perpetrated by nonsupervisors, which the courts
generally have agreed is a negligence standard of whether the employer "knew or
should have known and failed to take prompt and appropriate remedial action."'"
should not be guided by this statement made in the context of a Title VII case. See infra notes
102-04 and accompanying text.
56 See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2267; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2290. The Restatement section
states:
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside
the scope of their employment, unless:
(d) the servant purported to act or speak on behalf of the principal and
there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.
I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
" See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292-93.
58 Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2268-69; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292-93. "A tangible
employment action [is] a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing,
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision
causing a significant change in benefits." Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2268.
" See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293.
60 673 So. 2d 994 (La. 1996). For a discussion of Baumeister, see supra notes 10-28 and
accompanying text.
6' Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 953 (D. Minn. 1998).
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The second problem was that the attorney was wrong in asserting that Faragher and
Ellerth apply to state tort claims.62
The attorney's argument about state claims, Title VII sexual harassment claims,
and the vicarious liability analyses was wrong. But I must admit that I paused and
seriously entertained his argument before I told him he was incorrect.63 His argument
struck a chord with me, however, causing me to reflect on the relationship between
Although neither of these Supreme Court decisions speaks directly to this issue,
the presumably still-valid law of this Circuit holds that, if [the harasser] and the
Plaintiff were merely co-employees, [the employer] is liable only if it "knew or
should have known of the harassment and failed to take immediate and
appropriate action."
Id. at 970 (quoting Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1378 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing
Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 966 (8th Cir. 1993))).
In a recent case, the Eleventh Circuit extended the Faragher and Ellerth analysis to a
case in which the claim was that "the supervisor's inaction with respect to a hostile work
environment created by coworker sexual harassment facilitated, prolonged, or otherwise
failed to arrest the harassment where the supervisor knew or should have known of it."
Coates v. Sundor Brands, Inc., 160 F.3d 688, 693 (11th Cir. 1998), withdrawn and
superseded by 164 F.3d 1361 (11 th Cir. 1999). The Eleventh Circuit subsequently withdrew
the opinion and substituted one reaching the same result that made no reference to Faragher
and Ellerth. See Coates v. Sundor Brands, Inc., 164 F.3d 1361 (1 th Cir. 1999), superseding
160 F.3d 688 (1Ith Cir. 1998). Coates and other early post-Faragher and -Ellerth decisions
demonstrate that courts are uncertain how far the vicarious liability principles of the Supreme
Court decisions should be extended. See also infra note 79 (discussing the Fifth Circuit's
short'lived extension of the Faragher and Ellerth analysis to punitive damages for
discriminatory termination in Deffenbaugh- Williams v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581
(5th Cir. 1998), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, No. 97-10685, 1999 WL 107104 (5th
Cir. Feb. 6, 1999)).
62 See, e.g., Grozdanich, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 981 (applying respondeat superior scope-of-
employment analysis to intentional tort claims of assault, battery, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress, after applying Faragher and Ellerth to Title VII claims); Youngblood
v. Alliance Pharm., No. Civ.A.95-2796, 1998 WL 676800, at *5-*6 (E.D. La. Sept. 30, 1998)
(applying state respondeat superior analysis to state tort claims and noting that Ellerth did
pot involve vicarious liability for state law claims); Duran v. Flagstar Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d
1195, 1200 (D. Colo. 1998) ("Faragher, a Title VII action ... had no binding or precedential
value in evaluating plaintiffs' Colorado tort claims for assault and outrageous conduct.");
Kelley v. Worley, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1304 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (applying the Faragher and Ellerth
decisions to deny defendant's motion for summary judgment on Title VII claims and
applying state law to grant defendant's motion for summary judgment on state invasion of
privacy claim); Seepersad v. D.A.O.R. Sec., Inc., No. 97 Civ.2086(SS), 1998 WL 474205
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 1998) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment on sexual
harassment under Faragher/Ellerth analysis and granting defendant's motion for summary
judgment on intentional tort theories under a respondeat superior analysis).
63 I should have paused even longer perhaps because he quickly told me that it was I who
was wrong. Lawyers, like law professors, are never wrong; thus, the quandary when a law
professor and a lawyer accuse each other of being wrong.
[Vol. 7:3
VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT
sexual harassment law under Title VII and state common law tort claims. Those
reflections helped me to define sexual harassment in terms of its evolving
relationship to tort law. They also helped me to decide whether what the Supreme
Court did in Faragher and Ellerth--creating a federal law of vicarious liability for
a type of sexual harassment-was a good development.
A. Before Faragher and Ellerth
I began studying and teaching sexual harassment law under Title VII several
years after the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Meritor. I had already taught
and studied torts. As one examining federal sexual harassment law in the mid- 1990s,
I noted many of the difficulties of the hostile environment theory'M and wondered
why these injuries were not left to state tort law. State tort theories exist that would
apply to the worst of the conduct, such as assault, battery, intentional infliction of
emotional distress ("IIED"), and invasion of privacy. Indeed, many plaintiffs in the
1990s were joining tort claims with their Title VII sexual harassment claims.65 This
was, to the best of my recollection, my "gut reaction" before I read the writings of
commentators who favored a tort approach to sexual harassment.66
I now believe that my first impression was wrong because it did not take into
account the historical development of the law. State tort law was not a viable avenue
6 These difficulties include: how bad conduct must be for a court to consider it
actionable and when conduct is "because of sex" within the meaning of Title VII. The second
problem is the one on which I focused my attention as I read cases and commentaries
addressing same-sex sexual harassment and issues such as "equal opportunity sexual
harassers." See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986)
(holding that equal opportunity harassment is not gender discrimination), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1041 (1987); Michelle Ridgeway Peirce, Sexual Harassment and Title VII-A Better
Solution, 30 B.C. L. REV. 1071, 1096 (1989) (noting that victims of equal opportunity
harassment suffer the same effects of sexual harassment as victims of opposite sex sexual
harassment).
65 Cf Sample Sexual Harassment Complaint, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT LITIGATION 1995,
at 465 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H-520, 1995) (including
claims for battery, assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent retention, and
negligent supervision). See also LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 34, at 351-70 (describing
common law theories asserted in sexual harassment cases); Michael Barrier, Sexual
Harassment, NATION'S Bus., Dec. 1, 1998, at 19 (quoting labor lawyer David Copus as
saying that state tort claims are "where the megabucks are going").
66 Professor Paul criticized the coverage of sexual harassment under Title VII and favored
replacement of that regime with a tort of sexual harassment regime. See Ellen Frankel Paul,
Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
333 (1990). Professor Epstein followed Paul, proclaiming the superiority of common law
coverage of sexual harassment, in his lightning rod work, Forbidden Grounds. See RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAWS 350-66 (1992).
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of recovery for plaintiffs before federal courts recognized sexual harassment claims
under Title VII.67 Federal law under Title VII first recognized sexual harassment as
actionable, and state tort law followed that lead.
In 1976, a federal district court, in Williams v. Saxbe 68 held for the first time that
sexual harassment was actionable under Title VII. The case was based on the quid
pro quo theory of sexual harassment. 69 The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") promulgated guidelines prohibiting sexual harassment, both
quid pro quo and hostile environment, in 1980.70 Then, in 1986, the Supreme Court,
in Meritor, followed lower courts in holding that hostile environment sexual
harassment is actionable under Title VII.7 ' After the federal courts placed their
imprimatur on the actionability of sexual harassment under a federal statute, courts
began recognizing that sexual harassment also was actionable under state tort law.72
Professor Gergen describes a "flood" of IED claims in the late 1980s, after these
claims "got swept up in the current of Title VII litigation" in the late 1970s and early
1980s.73 Now, leading commentators on tort law maintain that sexual harassment on
the job does constitute IIED, 74 and some commentators argue that such conduct
67 See John J. Donohue 1I1, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment
Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1583 (1992). Criticizing Epstein's analysis, Professor
Donohue states:
Perhaps these tort doctrines could have supplied the basis for a legal action for
a woman who was confronted by what we now call hostile environment and quid
pro quo sexual harassment, but there seems to be no evidence of any such cases
being successfully prosecuted, and Epstein does not cite a single one in his book.
In the face of the "inexorable zero," it seems that Catherine [sic] MacKinnon's
claim that "sexual harassment has been not only legally allowed; it has been
legally unthinkable," is a more accurate description of the reality faced by
women prior to the emerging federal law of sexual harassment than that afforded
by Epstein's dry recitation of the Restatement of Torts.
Id. at 1610-11 (quoting MACKINNON, supra note 1, at xi) (citations omitted).
6 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976).
69 See id. at 657-61.
70 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1998).
"' See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). For a history of sexual
harassment law, see I ALBA CONTE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: LAW AND
PRACTICE 15-83 (2d ed. 1994); LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 34, at 3-43.
72 See Mark P. Gergen, A Grudging Defense of the Role of the Collateral Torts in
Wrongful Termination Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1693, 1709-10 (1996).
73 Id. at 1709.
71 See DAN DOBBS ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 18 (Supp. 1988)
("Sexual harassment on the job is undoubtedly an intentional infliction of emotional
distress."). But see Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1487 (3d Cir. 1990)
(stating that, under Pennsylvania law, sexual harassment alone generally is not sufficiently
outrageous to constitute a claim of lIED).
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should be held outrageous per se.75 Thus, state tort law has followed the
development of Title VII sexual harassment law.
Although I came to reject my initial impression that Title VII need not have
covered sexual harassment, there remains a separate question of whether sexual
harassment law still needs Title VII. In light of tort law's development, why do we
still need Title VII coverage of sexual harassment? One cannot deny that sexual
harassment, and other types of harassment in employment, are more tort-like than
other types of employment discrimination." Indeed, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 7"
adding compensatory and punitive damages, made Title VII as a whole more tort-
like.7" I agree, however, with many commentators who argue that Title VII sexual
harassment and tort law also are different.79 The call for tort versions of sexual
"s See Krista J. Schoenheider, Comment, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1461, 1482-83 (1986).
76 Professor Bernstein, a torts and employment discrimination teacher and scholar,
describes this idea:
Sexual harassment falls within the judicial framework of tort law and tortlike
actions under Title VII. The post-1991 version of the statute fits closely within
this paradigm, but the 1964 original . . . also affirms the power of private
litigation.
Title VII is not a tort statute... but the statute does depend on the players,
practices, and strengths of citizen-initiated litigation.
Bernstein, Respect in Retrospect, supra note 3, at 1242-43.
71 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified principally in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a
(1994)).
78 Cf. Cheryl Krause Zemelman, Note, The After-Acquired Evidence Defense to
Employment Discrimination Claims: The Privatization of Title VII and the Contours of
Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L. REV. 175, 193-97 (1993) (recognizing the different
purposes of Title VII and tort law and decrying the "privatization" of Title VII). Professor
White suggests that the addition of compensatory and punitive damages may call into
question the heretofore unquestioned vicarious liability imposed for employment
discrimination other than hostile environment sexual harassment. See White, supra note 34,
at 512-13.
71 See, e.g., Oppenheimer, supra note 45, at 93 ("Sexual harassment is not merely a
common-law tort, such as assault, battery, defamation, or intentional infliction of emotional
distress; it is also a statutory wrong for which Congress has provided free government
investigations, federal jurisdiction, and attorneys' fees as well as legal damages."). Justice
Thomas stated this principle in his dissenting opinion in Ellerth: "Popular misconceptions
notwithstanding, sexual harassment is not a freestanding federal tort, but a form of
employment discrimination." Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2275
(Thomas, J., dissenting). The proposition for which Justice Thomas was arguing was that a
distinct standard of employer liability for sexual harassment should not be adopted. Believing
that racial harassment and other forms of employment discrimination require that employers
be "truly at fault," Justice Thomas argued that all forms of employment discrimination under
Title VII should be treated equally. Id. Justice Thomas's concerns are curious in light of the
fact that there is nothing in Faragher or Ellerth to prevent the extension of the vicarious
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liability analysis to other types of harassment by supervisors. For example, one federal
district court extended the Faragher/Ellerth holdings to racial harassment. See Booker v.
Budget Rent-a-Car Sys., 17 F. Supp. 2d 735 (M.D. Tenn. 1998). Also, a Fifth Circuit panel
extended Faragher/Ellerth in a way that could have broader impact if the panel's approach
is adopted by the en banc court on rehearing. See Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 156 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 1998), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, No. 97-10685, 1999
WL 107104 (5th Cir. Feb. 26, 1999).
In Deffenbaugh, the Fifth Circuit panel held that the new standard applied to the issue
of whether a supervisor's discriminatory termination of an employee could be attributed to
the employer for the purpose of satisfying the heightened requirements for punitive damages.
See id at 592-93. The lower court reasoned that the employer could not be liable for the
supervisor's "malicious" or "reckless" conduct when it did not know nor should it have
known of the conduct. See id. at 593-94. The Fifth Circuit panel reversed, interpreting
Faragher and Ellerth as follows: "In adopting this standard, the Court's purpose apparently
was not to state a standard solely for sexual harassment claims .... Accordingly, it appears
that the Court intended to apply these same agency principles to all vicarious liability
inquiries under Title VII for acts by supervisors, including racial discrimination." Id. at 593.
On rehearing, the en banc Fifth Circuit may not extend the Faragher/Ellerth vicarious
liability analysis to liability for punitive damages. In a recent opinion, the Eleventh Circuit
disagreed with the vacated Fifth Circuit panel decision in Deffenbaugh. See Dudley v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1323 n.8 (1 th Cir. 1999) ("Given the requirement of
notice or knowledge for punitive damages in this Circuit.... we are doubtful that Faragher,
which is not about punitive damages, can (or was intended to) overrule our pre-Faragher
punitive damages precedent.").
It is interesting that the extension of the sexual harassment liability principles to
another Title VII vicarious liability issue in the vacated panel decision in Deffenbaugh
produced a favorable result for a plaintiff. Professor Rebecca Hanner White warned that the
liability analysis applied to hostile environment cases should not affect other vicarious
liability issues under the federal employment discrimination laws. See White, supra note 34,
at 536-38. Her cautionary note was delivered at a time when the employer-liability analyses
for sexual harassment imposed limitations on liability. The Faragher/Ellerth analysis
discards most of the limitations of the former analyses and effects the almost automatic
vicarious liability applicable to other discriminatory actions. See id. at 510. Professor White
may not be wholly comfortable, however, with the extension of the liberalized sexual
harassment standard to the issue of punitive damages. As she explains, the amendment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 to provide for compensatory and punitive damages may call into
question heretofore generally accepted vicarious liability principles under the employment
discrimination laws; courts that impose vicarious liability, without hesitation, on employers
for equitable relief may hesitate to impose such liability for compensatory and punitive
damages. See id. at 512-13. Professor White's analysis calls into question whether the
Faragher/Ellerth analysis is well suited to all vicarious liability issues under the
discrimination acts, particularly the issue of liability for punitive damages addressed in
Deffenbaugh.
The vacated Deffenbaugh panel decision and the Eleventh Circuit panel's withdrawal
of its opinion extending Faragher/Ellerth to supervisor inaction in Coates v. Sundor Brands,
Inc., 160 F.3d 688 (1 th Cir. 1998), withdrawn and superseded by 164 F.3d 1361 (1 1th Cir.
1999), illustrate the uncertainty of courts regarding the breadth of applicability of the new
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harassment have not abated, although some would replace Title VII coverage,"° while
others would augment Title VII coverage with a new tort.8'
Even if one concludes that sexual harassment has a certain "tortiness" about it
and that some tort theories generally are applicable to such conduct, that does not
lead necessarily to the conclusion that Title VII coverage is superfluous and should
be eliminated. As Professor Martha Chamallas has explained, tort law, because of
its wariness of emotional distress, is not an adequate substitute for Title VII
coverage.82
Finally, the relationship between federal sexual harassment law under Title VII
and state tort law leads me to conclude that the Supreme Court did a good thing by
announcing a federal law of vicarious liability in Faragher and Ellerth. Words of
caution, however, are in order. The Court's holdings in those cases changed only the
law of vicarious liability for Title VII sexual harassment, and those cases should not
affect respondeat superior analysis under state tort law.
B. Severing The Ties of Title VII Sexual Harassment Law and Tort Law:
Something Lost, Something Gained, and Something to Guard Against
Make no mistake about it-Faragher and Ellerth represent a significant severing
of ties between Title VII sexual harassment law and tort law. While Title VII sexual
harassment case law was shaping the contours of tort theories, particularly IIED,83
tort law was giving something to sexual .harassment law-its respondeat superior
vicarious liability analysis. As a torts and employment discrimination teacher, I
viewed this symbiotic relationship favorably. It seems appropriate that Title VII
should have given meaning to the element of outrageous conduct under IIED. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts defines "extreme and outrageous conduct" as conduct
"so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community."" Federal civil rights legislation seems a good gauge of what
society deems intolerable.
The second part of the relationship-the loaning of respondeat superior by tort
law to Title VII sexual harassment-however, was a less comfortable fit. The
vicarious liability analysis. For a discussion of Coates, see supra note 61.
80 See Mark McLaughlin Hager, Harassment As a Tort: Why Title VII Hostile
Environment Liability Should Be Curtailed, 30 CONN. L. REv. 375 (1998). Significantly,
Professor Hager would substitute tort coverage for Title VII coverage only for co-employee
sexual harassment. See id.
81 See Schoenheider, supra note 75, at 1485-94.
82 See Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U.
PA. L. REv. 463, 515-17 (1998).
83 See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
84 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (965).
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Supreme Court recognized this in Faragher and Ellerth and appropriately severed
the ties. As a result, something was lost, something was gained, and the cases left
courts something to guard against.
1. Something Lost
In Jansen,85 Judge Easterbrook disagreed with his colleagues about developing
a new federal standard of vicarious liability for supervisors' sexual harassment.86 He
objected that, when a federal statute does not specify a standard or rule, the courts are
to look to state law, unless applying state law would interfere with or undermine the
objective of the federal law.87 Judge Easterbrook did not see anything in the
respondeat superior analysis of Illinois or other states that frustrated the purposes of
Title VII. 8 Evaluating the law in that way, Judge Easterbrook thought that
something significant would be lost by developing a federal common law of vicarious
liability for Title VII sexual harassment. He explained that loss: "Why should an act
of sexual harassment by a supervisor be attributed to the firm under state law but not
under Title VII (or under Title VII but not state law)? Federal common law achieves
horizontal but not vertical uniformity."89 Thus, Judge Easterbrook favored a state of
the law in which employers would be liable or not liable under both federal and state
law; that is, the result would be the same under Title VII and under state law. It is
not clear from his opinion whether Judge Easterbrook was being descriptive or
prescriptive. Judge Coffey, in another of the many Jansen opinions, contended that
such a state of the law had never existed, positing, instead, that the courts had been
using federal common law, not state vicarious liability law, to decide liability under
Title VII. 90
The debate between Judges Easterbrook and Coffey (and others) calls for an
answer to a question: Before Faragher and Ellerth, what was the law regarding the
basis for employers' Title VII liability for supervisors' hostile environment sexual
harassment? Did the courts follow state respondeat superior law or did they create
law? The answer is that Judge Coffey presented a fairly accurate picture when he
85 Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997), affd sub nom.
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998). Jansen was one of two
consolidated cases before the en banc Seventh Circuit; Ellerth was the other.
86 See id. at 552 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
87 See id. at 553 (citing Atherton v. FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 666, 670 (1997)).
88 See id. at 554-56.
89 Id. at 553.
90 See id. at 552 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 563-
65 (Manion, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing Judge Easterbrook's
approach as "unusual" and inconsistent with the scope and purpose of Title VII); id. at 506-
10 (Posner, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that courts must develop
liability principles as a matter of federal common law).
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stated: "Out of the vast constellation of Title VII cases decided by the federal
courts,... I have been unable to locate a single precedent that supports the unique
position of Judges Easterbrook and Wood on this choice of law question."'" Courts
applied several different bases for determining liability,92 and those rationales did not
derive obviously from state law; that is, the courts usually cited other federal court
decisions.
Given this state of pre-Faragher and pre-Ellerth law, then, what has been lost?
The vertical uniformity favored by Judge Easterbrook never existed. It never was
true that if an employer was liable (or not liable) for a supervisor's hostile
environment harassment, it also would be liable (or not liable) under applicable state
tort theories. Would sexual harassment plaintiffs have benefited from such a state
of the law? Asked differently, if the Supreme Court had instructed courts to look to
state respondeat superior law as the basis for employer liability for supervisors'
sexual harassment, would plaintiffs have benefitted? The answer is probably not,
under the state of the law as it existed then.93 State courts, however, probably
softened their scope-of-employment analyses on some torts claims in light of the
nebulous link between the bases for liability for sexual harassment and for state
torts.94 Moreover, if the Supreme Court had directed courts to employ state
9' Id. at 523. Judge Coffey's statement may be a bit too much. In one case, the Fourth
Circuit applied state respondeat superior principles and relied on Virginia cases in its
discussion of the employer's liability for the supervisor's sexual harassment. See Martin v.
Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343 (4th Cir. 1995). The court in Martin did qualify its
analysis, however, by saying that it was "[a]ssuming, without deciding .... that these
common law agency principles establish the proper standard." Id. at 1351. Furthermore, state
courts also decide Title VII sexual harassment cases, and some have applied state respondeat
superior analyses. See, e.g., Alphonse v. Omni Hotels Management Corp., 643 So. 2d 836,
840 (La. App. 4th 1994) ("Under Title VII, liability attaches to the employer only if it is
shown that the conduct occurred within the course and scope of the harasser's employment,
and the employer failed to prevent or correct the situation.").
92 See sources cited supra note 34; see also Justin S. Weddle, Note, Title VII Sexual
Harassment: Recognizing an Employer's Non-Delegable Duty to Prevent a Hostile
Workplace, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 724, 734-37 (describing the circuits' approaches). After
describing the different approaches, one commentator offered the following criticism:
"[N]one of the agency rules.., produces completely satisfactory results. Perhaps for this
reason, courts tend to apply different rules in different settings, often in an apparently
manipulative, result-oriented fashion." Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment
Liability Under Agency Principles: A Second Look at Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
44 VAND. L. REv. 1229, 1255-56 (1991) (citation omitted).
9' See Weber, supra note 15, at 1514 ("The traditional view is that sexual assault is either
personally motivated or so unusual that it is outside of the assailant's scope of
employment.").
9' The Supreme Court of Louisiana seemed to do this in Baumeister v. Plunkett, 673 So.
2d 994 (La. 1996), although the court ultimately did not impose liability. For further
discussion of the case, see supra notes 10-31 and accompanying text. Cf Faragher v. City
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respondeat superior analysis to sexual harassment cases, I think it is reasonable to
assume that state courts would have softened their state analyses further. If courts
had employed a softer respondeat superior analysis permitting plaintiffs to recover
under Title VII and state tort theories, plaintiffs would have benefited. State tort
theories offer the advantage of damages that are not capped, as they are under Title
VII.95
I do not argue that vertical uniformity would have been a good result, even if it
had benefited sexual harassment plaintiffs. The result reached in Faragher and
Ellerth is appropriate for the reasons discussed below.
What has been lost is a nebulous tie between Title VII sexual harassment law and
state tort law. This is appropriate, yet strangely saddening, given the history the two
bodies of law have shared.96
of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2287 (1998) (citing state cases that employed "an expansive
sense of scope of employment" in state tort claims). Consider, for instance, the fact that some
Florida state courts interpreted a Florida Supreme Court opinion as collapsing the "stricter"
respondeat superior principles under Florida law with the "lesser" respondeat superior
elements of Title VII. See Sparks v. Jay's A.C. & Refrigeration, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 1433
(M.D. Fla. 1997) (rejecting this proposition as an incorrect interpretation of the Florida
Supreme Court's opinion).
Although sexual harassment law is not necessarily the reason, the Virginia Supreme
Court adopted a plaintiff-friendly standard of respondeat superior in Plummer v. Center
Psychiatrists, Ltd., 476 S.E.2d 172 (Va. 1996). Under that standard, once a plaintiff
establishes an employer-employee relationship, the burden shifts to the employer to prove
that the employee was not acting in the scope of his employment. See id at 174. If the
evidence leaves the question in doubt, then it becomes a jury question. See id Although
Plummer was not an employment sexual harassment case, it involved a claim by a plaintiff
that her psychologist had sexual intercourse with her during a counseling session. Plaintiff
sued on theories of assault and battery. See id. at 173; see also Kidwell v. Sheetz, Inc., 982
F. Supp. 1177, 1187 (W.D. Va. 1997) (interpreting and applying the Plummer standard).
95 See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 34, at 128 (Supp. 1997); Barrier, supra note 65,
at 19 (quoting labor lawyer David Copus as saying that state tort claims are "where the
megabucks are going"). Title VII, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, caps the total
of compensatory and punitive damages at $50,000, $100,000, $200,000, or $300,000,
depending on the number of employees the employer has. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)
(1994). Plaintiffs still may be able to recover uncapped damages under state fair employment
practice acts. It remains to be seen whether the courts will apply the Faragher/Ellerth
standard under such acts. See Veco, Inc. v. Rosebrock, Nos. S-7080, S-7120, 1998 WL
881190, at *6 n.17 (Alaska Dec. 18, 1998) (leaving this question open); Steele v. Superior
Home Health Care, No. 03A01-9709-CH-00395, 1998 WL 783348, at *6 n.6 (Tenn. App.
Nov. 10, 1998) (leaving the question to the Tennessee Supreme Court). The Kentucky Court
of Appeals adopted Faragher/Ellerth for its fair employment practice act. See Hill v.
Gateway Reg'l Health Sys., Inc., No. 97-CA-i 130-MR, 1998 WL 412623, at * 11 n.2 (Ky.
App. July 24, 1998). In states in which the state act specifies the standard for imposing
liability, adoption of Faragher/Ellerth is not an issue. See, e.g., Webb v. Lustig, 700 N.E.2d
220 (II1. App. Ct. 1998), appeal denied, 182 1ll.2d 573 (1999).
96 See supra notes 64-82 and accompanying text.
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2. Something Gained
Something has been gained in the unleashing of the basis of liability analysis for
supervisor hostile environment sexual harassment from states' respondeat superior
analysis-although that leash may have been long already. As the Supreme Court
recognized, trying to hold employers liable for sexual harassment under course-and-
scope analysis was straining and, in some cases, distorting that analysis.97 Title VII
is public law, not a common law tort, having as its principal purpose not redress of
injuries, but deterrence of sexual harassment in the workplace and eradication of such
conduct. 8 To effect that policy, courts must, in most cases, hold employers
accountable for the conduct of their supervisors. Tort law, in contrast, focuses much
more on compensation for injuries. Generally, respondeat superior analysis addresses
the issue of whether a particular risk "'should be considered as one of the normal
risks to be borne by the business."'" The Court concluded that state agency law
under course-and-scope analysis could not be relied upon to impose liability on
employers often enough."° The Faragher/Ellerth standard should result in more
victories for plaintiffs, whether they come in the form ofjudgments or settlements.' 0
See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2266-67 (1998); Faragher, 118
S. Ct. at 2288-90.
98 See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
417-18 (1975)).
" Sykes, supra note 14, at-563 (quoting I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229
cmt. a (1958)); see also Oppenheimer, supra note 45, at 78-79 (discussing rationales for
respondeat superior liability).
"0 A federal district court applying Minnesota's respondeat superior analysis to state law
claims of assault, battery, and IIED, explained the difficulties of holding employers liable for
sexual assaults in Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Center:
We recognize the paradox presented by a foreseeability standard for
respondeat superior liability, especially in cases, such as this one, where the tort
involves a sexual assault. Naturally, the more outrageous the employee's tortious
act should be, the less likely it could be described as foreseeable, and the less
likely that the employer could be required to assume responsibility for the act,
as a general risk of the employer's business. In fact, this paradox has prompted
one commentator to remark: "It is a curious state of affairs, in which the less
badly treated a complainant has been, the better are his prospects of getting
damages!"
Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., 25 F. Supp. 2d 953, 979 (D. Minn. 1998) (quoting
T. BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 193 (1916)).
By adopting a standard of liability for statutory sexual harassment by supervisors
distinct from that applied under tort law, the United States Supreme Court followed the
example of the Supreme Court of Canada. See Robichaud v. The Queen, 40 D.L.R.4th 577
(1987) (rejecting the application of the tort standard to supervisor sexual harassment cases
under the Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C., ch. H-6 (1985) (Can.)).
0' Defendant employers are less likely to win summary judgments on the issue of basis
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What has been gained is a standard that is likely to effectuate the objectives of
Title VII. Moreover, uniformity has been gained in response to the pleas of the lower
courts.
3. Something to Guard Against
In Faragher and Ellerth, the Court severed a link between state tort law and Title
VII. Now courts (federal and state) °2 can go about their business in supervisor
hostile environment sexual harassment cases without concerning themselves with the
respondeat superior analyses of the states or federal variations of those analyses. On
the other side, courts (state and federal)" 3 also should be wary of letting
developments in the sexual harassment cases unduly influence their analysis of state
respondeat superior law. That is not to say that state courts should adopt more
restrictive tests for respondeat superior. Rather, courts applying state respondeat
superior analysis are free now to do as they please to accomplish the objectives of tort
law without the brooding spectre of sexual harassment law. Courts should heed the
underlying message of Faragher and Ellerth that vicarious liability analyses are not
"one size fits all" items. Indeed, the federal courts are now struggling with the idea
that the new vicarious liability analysis of Faragher and Ellerth may not fit all issues
that arise under federal sexual harassment law.0 4
V. CONCLUSION
That is it. That is all I can write. I hope my grader is lenient (viewed from a
plaintiff's perspective), applying a standard akin to the Court's in Faragher/Ellerth.
I know I have not really answered the exam question, but remember, I admitted I did
not have an overarching theory of sexual harassment. I merely wanted to ruminate
on the relationship between federal sexual harassment law and state tort law after two
landmark Supreme Court cases. Although the Faragher and Ellerth decisions
created a disconnexity between sexual harassment law and tort law, I do not perceive
the cases as having created a new paradigm for the new millennium-whatever that
means.
Perhaps those spirits will let me rest now. Exams are over.
of liability. For a debate on whether the foregoing is true, see the majority and concurring
opinions in Lissau v. Southern Food Service, Inc., 159 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 1998). See also,
e.g., Grozdanich, 25 F. Supp. 2d 953 (denying summary judgment on a Title VII sexual
harassment claim under the Faragher/Ellerth standard and granting it on state law claims for
assault, battery, and lIED).
102 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
103 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
104 See supra notes 61 and 79.
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